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audience. I am sure you will enjoy 
Bill’s take on his travels in France 
and his view of the French and 
French culture.
In the last few years Patti Fanning, 
also of the Sociology Department, 
has come on board as Associate 
Editor. Patti, brings not only her 
writing and editing skills to the 
Review, but also her passion for 
local history, Irish studies and 
biography of Massachusetts 
luminaries. Her contributions 
to the magazine have been read 
with great interest by our readers. 
In this issue Patti writes on the 
Missionary Sisters of Louisburg 
Square, who were one of the first 
religious orders to minister to the 
African-Americans of Boston. 
Patti is an Associate Editor who I 
hope will remain with the Review 
for many years to come.
Finally, Charles Angell, the mag-
azine’s book review editor, has 
been with the Review from almost 
the beginning. Charlie has one of 
the toughest jobs on the maga-
zine—to comment on and critique the books that we 
feel our readers need to know about. During his time as 
book review editor, Charlie has reviewed a wide range of 
books from Philip Roth’s The Plot Against America to the 
self-help manual Who Moved My Cheese to in this issue, 
American Vertigo, Bernard Levy’s acclaimed retracing of 
Alexis de Tocqueville’s travels through America. Charlie 
is one of the most thoughtful and erudite members of 
the faculty that I have had the pleasure of working with 
over the years.
As a senior member of the faculty I have been asked  
on many occasions by prospective students and con-
cerned parents to tell them why they should choose 
Bridgewater State College. Of course the cost is quite 
attractive and the location close to home is a bonus as 
well. But I dwell on the faculty and give them a copy 
of the Bridgewater Review. I tell them that if their son 
or daughter wants to go to a college where faculty 
members place their primary emphasis on teaching and 
working with students, yet are so dedicated to their aca-
demic disciplines that they are also scholars of the first 
degree, then there is no better place than Bridgewater. 
If the Bridgewater Review has done anything over the 
last 25 years, I hope that it has been helpful in alerting 
the general public to the very special faculty who teach 
here. Happy Birthday Bridgewater Review, and to my fel-
low faculty colleagues, thanks for being so special.
Michael Kryzanek 
Editor 
In 2005, Iraq held three successful national elections 
that were largely free and credible by accepted interna-
tional standards. On January 30, 58% of registered vot-
ers went to the polls to elect the Transitional National 
Assembly (TNA), which wrote the new Constitution. 
On October 15, 63% of registered voters turned out 
for the constitutional referendum to approve the new 
Constitution by an overwhelming margin of 79% to 
21%. And on December 15, 76% of registered voters 
cast ballots to elect the 275-seat Council of Representa-
tives (COR), Iraq’s national legislature.1 
 
Holding three elections in one year is a daunting task 
even for established democracies, but it is an extraordi-
nary feat for a country that is trying to establish a new 
democracy after three decades of tyranny while being 
wracked by terrorist bombings and violent insurgency. 
The overall incidence and intensity of terrorist and in-
surgent attacks declined progressively on each Election 
Day, but the terrorists and insurgents posed an ever-
present threat, intimidating, kidnapping and occasion-
ally killing political candidates, voters, poll workers and 
election officials in the lead up to all three elections.
The elections were important components of a larger 
political process designed to establish the institu-
tional and political foundations for democracy in Iraq 
in the aftermath of the American-led invasion that 
overthrew Saddam Hussein in March 2003. The COR 
elections represented the final step in the formation of 
a democratic government. But as Iraqi leaders wrangled 
unsuccessfully over the choice of a new Prime Minister 
and the composition of the new government two 
months after the COR elections, a terrorist bomb ripped 
.In addition, approximately 300,000 Iraqi citizens living in 8 
countries across the world voted in January and December, but 
not in October due to logistical constraints. Also, approximately 
200,000 eligible voters incarcerated in prisons and deten-
tion centers (under both Iraqi and US control, including the 
infamous Abu Ghraib prison), residing as patients in hospitals, 
and serving in the Iraqi police force and the military voted in 
special one-day elections held prior to the regularly scheduled 
elections in October and December. It is not known whether 
Saddam Hussein, who was being held in a US detention center 
and was an eligible voter, chose to exercise his franchise. For 
reasons of space, this article does not deal with these elections.
through one of Iraq’s holiest Shiite mosques in Samarra 
on February 22, 2006, unleashing a paroxysm of retalia-
tory sectarian attacks and pushing the country to the 
brink of an all-out civil war.
Iraq thus confronts a central challenge today: will its 
political future be determined by the three resoundingly 
successful elections held in 2005, or by the brutality and 
violence of terrorism, insurgency and sectarian conflict?  
This article answers this question through a systematic 
analysis and pragmatic assessment of the relationship 
between elections and violence and its impact on the 
prospects for democracy in Iraq.
THE THREE ELECTIONS 
Given the precarious security conditions caused by 
militant insurgency and terrorist bombings, the three 
Iraqi elections in 2005 were a resounding success. One 
factor contributing to 
this success was a rare 
manifestation of sound 
political judgment by 
the US when it relented 
on its initial refusal to 
allow a substantial role 
for the UN in Iraq and 
agreed to an exclusive 
UN role in assisting 
the newly-established 
Independent Election 
Commission of Iraq 
(IECI) in the organi-
zation and management of the three elections. This 
change in US policy, however, was due largely to the 
steadfast opposition of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, 
Iraq’s most revered Shiite religious leader and an astute 
political strategist, to any US involvement in the elec-
tions because it would diminish the legitimacy of the 
elections in the eyes of the Iraqis and the international 
community, and to his uncompromising insistence on 
an exclusive UN role in overseeing the elections.
The IECI, whose seven members and the Chief Electoral 
Officer were selected by the United Nations (UN), 
received the full range of organizational, technical 
and logistical assistance that is now commonplace in 
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Elections Assistance Team operating under the United 
Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq and funded from a 
general UN fund facility with contributions from 25 
countries, including the United States. This assistance 
enabled the IECI to organize the three elections profes-
sionally and execute them competently according to 
accepted international standards.
Amidst escalating terrorist and insurgent attacks, the 
IECI conducted a successful voter registration exercise 
in November 2004, registering 14.3 million voters, 
which represented a substantial percentage of eligible 
voters in an estimated population of 28 million people, 
almost half of whom are minors. It conducted another 
registration exercise in August 2005 to update the voter 
list, increasing the number of registered voters since 
January to 15.5 million. In response to the poor security 
situation in the dangerous western governorate of 
Anbar (the heart of Sunni insurgency and the scene of 
high US casualties), the IECI extended this registration 
period by one week, resulting in an 18% increase since 
January in the registration of Sunni voters.
These high registration figures translated into increas-
ingly higher voter turnout from 58% to 63% to 76% 
through the three elections (Table 1). Voter turnout 
increased even more sharply in the Sunni majority 
governorates of Anbar and Salahaddin (where Saddam 
Hussein’s hometown of Tikrit is located), in Diyala and 
Ninewa, both with heavily mixed populations but with 
a Sunni majority, and in Baghdad with a heavily mixed 
population but with a Shiite majority. Anbar wit-
nessed a dramatic increase from 2% in January to 38% 
in October and 86% in December, with corresponding 
figures of 29%, 90%, and 98% for Salahaddin, 33%, 67%, 
and 75% for Diyala, 17%, 54%, and 70% for Ninewa, 
and 51%, 55% and 70% in Baghdad.
table 1  
Voter turnout percentages in three  Iraqi elections in 2005
Governorates January october december
Anbar  2.42  38.35  86.37 
Babil  73.06  72.74  79.43 
Baghdad  51.49  54.97  70.06
Basrah  72.36  63.01  74.20 
Diyala  33.09  67.41  74.87 
Dohuk  92.46  84.81  92.00
Erbil  83.79  95.46  95.26 
Karbala  74.75  60.19  70.44  
Misan  61.25  57.59  73.27
Muthanna  64.79  58.80  66.07 
Najaf  75.25  56.51  72.76 
Ninewa  16.96  53.50  70.16
Qadissiya  70.73  56.71  64.67 
Salahaddin  29.25  90.36  98.43 
Suleimaniya  82.11  75.25  84.19
Taamim  70.01  78.47  86.10 
Theqar  68.84  56.62  71.85 
Wasit  71.08  53.72  67.99
IraQ  58.32  63.28  76.36 
These high registration and turnout figures testify 
to the strong and widespread support for democracy 
expressed by all Iraqis in several public opinion polls. 
In one poll, for instance, 91% of respondents favored 
democracy over authoritarian rule, and 85% favored 
democracy despite its manifest limitations.2  These 
figures also testify to the success of IECI’s new nation-
wide security provisions and its special provisions in 
Anbar to help increase Sunni participation in October 
and December. These provisions included: a three-ring 
security perimeter around polling stations manned by 
all-Iraqi security forces, backed with unobtrusive US 
military support, for three days before and after Election 
Day; coordination with local leaders, and even with 
some Sunni insurgents (via mediation by Sunni politi-
cians) for additional security on Election Day; increased 
recruitment of Sunni poll workers; and IECI rulings 
that permitted voters classified as “internally displaced 
persons” (due to political violence) to vote in designated 
polling stations, and voters who could not reach their 
assigned polling stations due to security threats to vote 
in the nearest safe polling stations.
Finally, the high figures testify to the refusal by the 
majority of ordinary Sunnis to repeat their strategic 
mistake in heeding their leaders’ misguided call to 
boycott the January TNA elections, which excluded the 
Sunnis from the constitution-writing process. Sunni 
voters thus turned out in huge numbers in October to 
reject the new Constitution with a 97% “No” vote in 
Anbar and an 82% “No” vote in Salahaddin. In Diyala, 
the Constitution barely passed with a 51% “Yes” vote. 
In Ninewa, only the combined high turnout among the 
Kurds, Shiites, Christians, Turkomans and other Arab 
minority groups helped to offset the high Sunni turnout 
and produce a 55% “No” vote against the Constitution, 
well-short of the two-thirds “No” vote in three gover-
norates required for the rejection of the Constitution 
and a new referendum. Sunni voters turned out in 
even higher numbers in December to elect three Sunni 
parties—the Iraqi Accordance Front, the Iraqi Front for 
National Dialogue, and the Iraqi Nation List—to the 
COR with a combined total of 56 seats, compared to 
none in the TNA (Table 2).
table 2  
results of the cor elections in Iraq, december 15, 2005
Political Parties seat totals seat %
Unified Iraqi Alliance  128  46.55  
Kurdistani Gathering  53  19.27 
Iraqi Accordance Front  44  16.00
National Iraqi List  25  9.09 
Iraqi Front for National Dialogue 11  4.00 
Islamic Union of Kurdistan  5  1.82
Liberation and Reconciliation Gathering 3  1.09 
Progressives  2  .73 
Iraqi National List  1  .36
Iraqi Turkoman Front  1  .36 
Al Ezediah Movement   1  .36  
     for Progressing and Reform 
Al Rafedeen List  1  .36
totals  275 100.00 
2. Mark Tessler, Mansoor Moaddel, and Ronald Inglehart, 
“What do Iraqis Want?” Journal of Democracy 7:  
(January 2006), pp. 38-50
The results in Table 2 approximate the broad sectar-
ian and ethnic divisions in Iraq, but these results also 
obscure politically salient intra-sectarian and intra-eth-
nic, as well as ideological, differences within the major 
parties in the COR, all of which are actually coalitions 
of groups representing these differences. The Kurdis-
tani Gathering, for instance, consists of two tradition-
ally antagonistic Kurdish parties – the Patriotic Union 
of Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Democratic Party—and 
includes a moderate religious party. But the Kurds are 
also represented by the fundamentalist Islamic Union 
of Kurdistan, with 5 COR seats. The three Sunni 
parties include nationalists, Islamists and secularists. 
The Iraqi Accordance Front with a broader support 
base includes the Iraqi Islamic Party, the Iraqi Front for 
National Dialogue includes a small Christian Party and 
two small Turkoman parties, and the Iraqi National 
List supports crackdown of Baathists and Sunni Islamic 
insurgents. The Iraqi National List headed by former 
Prime Minister Iyad Allawi is a secular nationalist coali-
tion of Sunnis and Shiites. It is the only party to win 
votes in every governorate, indicating the existence of 
a nationwide secular base that could be mobilized to 
counter the growing influence of Islamists.
The most important of these intra-group differences, 
however, exists within the United Iraq Alliance (UIA), 
the Islamist-leaning Shiite political bloc that controls 
128 COR seats. The UIA, which consists of 16 mostly 
small parties, is spearheaded by three major parties 
which together control 82 seats, but which also have 
deep political differences. The Supreme Council for 
Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) with 25 seats is heav-
ily Islamist and is widely viewed to posses close political 
ties with Iran, where it was founded by Iraqi Shiite 
exiles in 1982. The al-Dawah Party (DP) with 25 seats 
includes a secular and a religious faction, and is headed 
by former interim Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafri. The 
al-Sadrites with 32 seats is headed by the populist and 
fiercely anti-American cleric, Moqtada al-Sadr.
Moqtada al-Sadr’s populism threatens the political 
leadership of the Shiite religious establishment in Najaf 
and of its spiritual head, Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani. His 
militia, the Mahdi Army, which has often clashed with 
SCIRI’s militia, the Badr Brigade, is now in virtually 
total control of Sadr City, the slum neighborhood of  
Baghdad from where Moqtada draws his political 
support.3  His supporters ran as independents in the 
3. Sadr City is named after Moqtada’s father, who was a 
grand ayatollah, and, along with his brothers, was killed by 
agents of Saddam Hussein. Moqtada aspires to inherit his 
father’s leadership mantle but cannot do so because he has never 
completed the rigorous religious education and training Shiite 
tradition requires before a person acquires the title of ayatollah.  
January elections, but because he has a large following 
among the Shiite poor classes, he was reluctantly in-
vited to join UIA for the December elections to ensure a 
Shiite legislative majority after the Sunnis agreed to par-
ticipate in the COR elections. As the largest party in the 
COR, the UIA has the constitutional authority to nomi-
nate a candidate for Prime Minister for final approval by 
the COR. In the ensuing fight for the nomination, the 
al-Sadrites’ control of 32 COR seats was indispensable 
in al-Jaafri’s unexpected victory by one vote over Adel 
Abdel-Mahdi of SCIRI, who was supported by other 
UIA, as well as by Kurdish and Sunni, parties.
However, a coalition of Kurdish, Sunni and secular 
nationalist parties fiercely opposed al-Jaafri’s candi-
dacy, because of his inept leadership as interim Prime 
Minister, and especially his inability to control the 
escalating violence in the wake of the Samarra mosque 
bombing and rein in the Ministry of Interior “death 
squads” who are widely known to engage in the 
systematic killing of Sunnis. As the political impasse 
continued with al-Jaafri’s adamant refusal to relinquish 
his candidacy, and as political violence pushed Iraq to 
the brink of civil war, opposition to his candidacy began 
to emerge even within the UIA. Under intense pressure 
from the United States, and nudged by the threat of an 
alternative Kurdish-Sunni-secular nationalist major-
ity coalition forming and nominating and approving 
its own candidate for Prime Minister, the UIA political 
leadership led by Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani forced al-
Jaafri on 20 April 2006 to relinquish his position, open-
ing the way for the formation of a unity government.
THE POLITICS AND PATTERNS OF VIOLENCE 
The formation of a unity government will not im-
mediately stop the violence gripping Iraq, but it is 
an essential first step in creating a favorable political 
environment for weakening, and eventually removing, 
the incentives for the use of violence, especially by the 
Sunni-led insurgency. Violence in Iraq, in other words, is 
neither sectarian nor ethnic based. It is politically driven,  
and thus requires a political solution. 
The data in Figure 1 indicate the political underpinnings 
of the violence, and especially the Sunni basis of the 
insurgency. Of the 8799 reported insurgents and ter-
rorist attacks between April 2004 and December 2005, 
47% were concentrated in the two Sunni governorates 
of Anbar and Salahddin, while 48% were concentrated 
in the heavily mixed governorates of Baghdad, Diyala, 
Ninewa and Tameem with large Sunni concentrations. 
By contrast, only 5% of the attacks occurred in the nine 
Shiite majority governorates, and a negligible .06% in 
the three Kurdish governorates.
Also indicative of the political basis of violence are the 
variations in its incidence and intensity, as well as the 
differences in the groups and their motivations for 
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Elections Assistance Team operating under the United 
Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq and funded from a 
general UN fund facility with contributions from 25 
countries, including the United States. This assistance 
enabled the IECI to organize the three elections profes-
sionally and execute them competently according to 
accepted international standards.
Amidst escalating terrorist and insurgent attacks, the 
IECI conducted a successful voter registration exercise 
in November 2004, registering 14.3 million voters, 
which represented a substantial percentage of eligible 
voters in an estimated population of 28 million people, 
almost half of whom are minors. It conducted another 
registration exercise in August 2005 to update the voter 
list, increasing the number of registered voters since 
January to 15.5 million. In response to the poor security 
situation in the dangerous western governorate of 
Anbar (the heart of Sunni insurgency and the scene of 
high US casualties), the IECI extended this registration 
period by one week, resulting in an 18% increase since 
January in the registration of Sunni voters.
These high registration figures translated into increas-
ingly higher voter turnout from 58% to 63% to 76% 
through the three elections (Table 1). Voter turnout 
increased even more sharply in the Sunni majority 
governorates of Anbar and Salahaddin (where Saddam 
Hussein’s hometown of Tikrit is located), in Diyala and 
Ninewa, both with heavily mixed populations but with 
a Sunni majority, and in Baghdad with a heavily mixed 
population but with a Shiite majority. Anbar wit-
nessed a dramatic increase from 2% in January to 38% 
in October and 86% in December, with corresponding 
figures of 29%, 90%, and 98% for Salahaddin, 33%, 67%, 
and 75% for Diyala, 17%, 54%, and 70% for Ninewa, 
and 51%, 55% and 70% in Baghdad.
table 1  
Voter turnout percentages in three  Iraqi elections in 2005
Governorates January october december
Anbar  2.42  38.35  86.37 
Babil  73.06  72.74  79.43 
Baghdad  51.49  54.97  70.06
Basrah  72.36  63.01  74.20 
Diyala  33.09  67.41  74.87 
Dohuk  92.46  84.81  92.00
Erbil  83.79  95.46  95.26 
Karbala  74.75  60.19  70.44  
Misan  61.25  57.59  73.27
Muthanna  64.79  58.80  66.07 
Najaf  75.25  56.51  72.76 
Ninewa  16.96  53.50  70.16
Qadissiya  70.73  56.71  64.67 
Salahaddin  29.25  90.36  98.43 
Suleimaniya  82.11  75.25  84.19
Taamim  70.01  78.47  86.10 
Theqar  68.84  56.62  71.85 
Wasit  71.08  53.72  67.99
IraQ  58.32  63.28  76.36 
These high registration and turnout figures testify 
to the strong and widespread support for democracy 
expressed by all Iraqis in several public opinion polls. 
In one poll, for instance, 91% of respondents favored 
democracy over authoritarian rule, and 85% favored 
democracy despite its manifest limitations.2  These 
figures also testify to the success of IECI’s new nation-
wide security provisions and its special provisions in 
Anbar to help increase Sunni participation in October 
and December. These provisions included: a three-ring 
security perimeter around polling stations manned by 
all-Iraqi security forces, backed with unobtrusive US 
military support, for three days before and after Election 
Day; coordination with local leaders, and even with 
some Sunni insurgents (via mediation by Sunni politi-
cians) for additional security on Election Day; increased 
recruitment of Sunni poll workers; and IECI rulings 
that permitted voters classified as “internally displaced 
persons” (due to political violence) to vote in designated 
polling stations, and voters who could not reach their 
assigned polling stations due to security threats to vote 
in the nearest safe polling stations.
Finally, the high figures testify to the refusal by the 
majority of ordinary Sunnis to repeat their strategic 
mistake in heeding their leaders’ misguided call to 
boycott the January TNA elections, which excluded the 
Sunnis from the constitution-writing process. Sunni 
voters thus turned out in huge numbers in October to 
reject the new Constitution with a 97% “No” vote in 
Anbar and an 82% “No” vote in Salahaddin. In Diyala, 
the Constitution barely passed with a 51% “Yes” vote. 
In Ninewa, only the combined high turnout among the 
Kurds, Shiites, Christians, Turkomans and other Arab 
minority groups helped to offset the high Sunni turnout 
and produce a 55% “No” vote against the Constitution, 
well-short of the two-thirds “No” vote in three gover-
norates required for the rejection of the Constitution 
and a new referendum. Sunni voters turned out in 
even higher numbers in December to elect three Sunni 
parties—the Iraqi Accordance Front, the Iraqi Front for 
National Dialogue, and the Iraqi Nation List—to the 
COR with a combined total of 56 seats, compared to 
none in the TNA (Table 2).
table 2  
results of the cor elections in Iraq, december 15, 2005
Political Parties seat totals seat %
Unified Iraqi Alliance  128  46.55  
Kurdistani Gathering  53  19.27 
Iraqi Accordance Front  44  16.00
National Iraqi List  25  9.09 
Iraqi Front for National Dialogue 11  4.00 
Islamic Union of Kurdistan  5  1.82
Liberation and Reconciliation Gathering 3  1.09 
Progressives  2  .73 
Iraqi National List  1  .36
Iraqi Turkoman Front  1  .36 
Al Ezediah Movement   1  .36  
     for Progressing and Reform 
Al Rafedeen List  1  .36
totals  275 100.00 
2. Mark Tessler, Mansoor Moaddel, and Ronald Inglehart, 
“What do Iraqis Want?” Journal of Democracy 7:  
(January 2006), pp. 38-50
The results in Table 2 approximate the broad sectar-
ian and ethnic divisions in Iraq, but these results also 
obscure politically salient intra-sectarian and intra-eth-
nic, as well as ideological, differences within the major 
parties in the COR, all of which are actually coalitions 
of groups representing these differences. The Kurdis-
tani Gathering, for instance, consists of two tradition-
ally antagonistic Kurdish parties – the Patriotic Union 
of Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Democratic Party—and 
includes a moderate religious party. But the Kurds are 
also represented by the fundamentalist Islamic Union 
of Kurdistan, with 5 COR seats. The three Sunni 
parties include nationalists, Islamists and secularists. 
The Iraqi Accordance Front with a broader support 
base includes the Iraqi Islamic Party, the Iraqi Front for 
National Dialogue includes a small Christian Party and 
two small Turkoman parties, and the Iraqi National 
List supports crackdown of Baathists and Sunni Islamic 
insurgents. The Iraqi National List headed by former 
Prime Minister Iyad Allawi is a secular nationalist coali-
tion of Sunnis and Shiites. It is the only party to win 
votes in every governorate, indicating the existence of 
a nationwide secular base that could be mobilized to 
counter the growing influence of Islamists.
The most important of these intra-group differences, 
however, exists within the United Iraq Alliance (UIA), 
the Islamist-leaning Shiite political bloc that controls 
128 COR seats. The UIA, which consists of 16 mostly 
small parties, is spearheaded by three major parties 
which together control 82 seats, but which also have 
deep political differences. The Supreme Council for 
Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) with 25 seats is heav-
ily Islamist and is widely viewed to posses close political 
ties with Iran, where it was founded by Iraqi Shiite 
exiles in 1982. The al-Dawah Party (DP) with 25 seats 
includes a secular and a religious faction, and is headed 
by former interim Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafri. The 
al-Sadrites with 32 seats is headed by the populist and 
fiercely anti-American cleric, Moqtada al-Sadr.
Moqtada al-Sadr’s populism threatens the political 
leadership of the Shiite religious establishment in Najaf 
and of its spiritual head, Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani. His 
militia, the Mahdi Army, which has often clashed with 
SCIRI’s militia, the Badr Brigade, is now in virtually 
total control of Sadr City, the slum neighborhood of  
Baghdad from where Moqtada draws his political 
support.3  His supporters ran as independents in the 
3. Sadr City is named after Moqtada’s father, who was a 
grand ayatollah, and, along with his brothers, was killed by 
agents of Saddam Hussein. Moqtada aspires to inherit his 
father’s leadership mantle but cannot do so because he has never 
completed the rigorous religious education and training Shiite 
tradition requires before a person acquires the title of ayatollah.  
January elections, but because he has a large following 
among the Shiite poor classes, he was reluctantly in-
vited to join UIA for the December elections to ensure a 
Shiite legislative majority after the Sunnis agreed to par-
ticipate in the COR elections. As the largest party in the 
COR, the UIA has the constitutional authority to nomi-
nate a candidate for Prime Minister for final approval by 
the COR. In the ensuing fight for the nomination, the 
al-Sadrites’ control of 32 COR seats was indispensable 
in al-Jaafri’s unexpected victory by one vote over Adel 
Abdel-Mahdi of SCIRI, who was supported by other 
UIA, as well as by Kurdish and Sunni, parties.
However, a coalition of Kurdish, Sunni and secular 
nationalist parties fiercely opposed al-Jaafri’s candi-
dacy, because of his inept leadership as interim Prime 
Minister, and especially his inability to control the 
escalating violence in the wake of the Samarra mosque 
bombing and rein in the Ministry of Interior “death 
squads” who are widely known to engage in the 
systematic killing of Sunnis. As the political impasse 
continued with al-Jaafri’s adamant refusal to relinquish 
his candidacy, and as political violence pushed Iraq to 
the brink of civil war, opposition to his candidacy began 
to emerge even within the UIA. Under intense pressure 
from the United States, and nudged by the threat of an 
alternative Kurdish-Sunni-secular nationalist major-
ity coalition forming and nominating and approving 
its own candidate for Prime Minister, the UIA political 
leadership led by Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani forced al-
Jaafri on 20 April 2006 to relinquish his position, open-
ing the way for the formation of a unity government.
THE POLITICS AND PATTERNS OF VIOLENCE 
The formation of a unity government will not im-
mediately stop the violence gripping Iraq, but it is 
an essential first step in creating a favorable political 
environment for weakening, and eventually removing, 
the incentives for the use of violence, especially by the 
Sunni-led insurgency. Violence in Iraq, in other words, is 
neither sectarian nor ethnic based. It is politically driven,  
and thus requires a political solution. 
The data in Figure 1 indicate the political underpinnings 
of the violence, and especially the Sunni basis of the 
insurgency. Of the 8799 reported insurgents and ter-
rorist attacks between April 2004 and December 2005, 
47% were concentrated in the two Sunni governorates 
of Anbar and Salahddin, while 48% were concentrated 
in the heavily mixed governorates of Baghdad, Diyala, 
Ninewa and Tameem with large Sunni concentrations. 
By contrast, only 5% of the attacks occurred in the nine 
Shiite majority governorates, and a negligible .06% in 
the three Kurdish governorates.
Also indicative of the political basis of violence are the 
variations in its incidence and intensity, as well as the 
differences in the groups and their motivations for 
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referendum and the December COR elections. The 
Sunni embrace of democratic transition enhanced the 
prospects of its success, forcing the diehard Baathists 
and the AQM to shift to sectarian violence in which 
Iraqi religious and political leaders and the new Iraqi 
police and military forces replaced the US and coalition 
forces as the principal targets.
The resounding success of the December elections 
in improving Sunni representation in the COR and 
participation in the new government precipitated the 
Samarra mosque bombing, most probably by AQM, as 
a last-ditch effort by extremists in the hope of unleash-
ing retaliatory sectarian attacks that would destabilize 
the country and derail the democratic transition. That 
such attacks occurred with increasing frequency and 
frightening intensity in the immediate aftermath of the 
bombing before subsiding testifies less to the success 
of the extremists’ tactics than to the disturbingly large 
numbers of Sunni and Shiite militias that have emerged 
in Iraq to fill the security vacuum created by inad-
equate US forces and the inexperience of the new Iraqi 
military and security forces. That these militias could 
themselves become the instruments of a prolonged 
Lebanon-style civil war cannot be discounted. To defuse 
this potentially explosive situation, the quick formation 
of government of national unity becomes all the more 
imperative.
CONCLUSION 
On April 23, 2005, after weeks of hard and contentious 
bargaining that led to the replacement of Ibrahim Jaafri 
with his deputy Nouri al-Maliki as the candidate for 
Prime Minister, the COR, meeting only for the second 
time since the December elections, authorized the new 
candidate to form a cabinet within the stipulated 30 
days and approved five key appointments that pave 
the way for the formation of a national unity govern-
ment. The COR reappointed the current President 
Jalal Talabani, a Kurd, and also appointed a Sunni and a 
Shitte as the two Vice-Presidents. It also elected a Sunni 
as the Speaker of the COR, and a Shiite and a Kurd as 
the two Deputy-Speakers.
These, however, are only the first steps. Jockeying for 
positions in the new cabinet will produce a new round 
of intense and possibly acrimonious bargaining. After 
the installation of the new cabinet, the new govern-
ment will have to confront, among the host of problems 
facing Iraq, the twin and related challenges of security 
and economic reconstruction. Insecurity remains the 
single most important threat to Iraq’s political stability. 
Confronting it will require convincing the remaining 
diehard Baathists that it is in their and the country’s in-
terest to accept the new reality. It will require defeating 
the AQM by killing the foreign jihadists who dominate 
it, simply because they will not give up without a 
fight. But most critically, it will require controlling and 
disbanding all the Sunni and Shiite militias that now 
provide much-needed security in a dangerously insecure 
environment, for, if left unchecked, they could easily 
transform themselves into permanent protection rack-
ets, as, for example,  in Afghanistan.
Security is also essential for the much-need economic 
reconstruction and development. Despite the invest-
ment of vast amounts of US funds, a variety of strategic 
and tactical mistakes that have become the hallmark of 
US policy in Iraq has contributed to the failure of the 
Iraqi economy to return even to its anemic pre-war lev-
els.4  Initial assessments based on flawed assumptions 
and intelligence viewed Iraq’s enormous oil resource as a 
crucial source for financing the postwar reconstruction. 
But in response to the international embargo imposed 
on Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War, Saddam Hussein cut 
back on the investments required to maintain and 
modernize the oil production facilities. Increased post-
war oil production has thus been stymied by decaying 
infrastructure.
Compounding the problem has been the terrorist and 
insurgent attacks on the oil facilities, as well as on many 
postwar reconstruction projects, killing both foreign 
contractors and Iraqi workers. The diversion of increas-
ingly larger amount of US reconstruction funds to the 
provision of security for these construction sites and  
oil refineries has, as a result, depleted the amount avail-
able for modernizing the oil facilities and financing the 
reconstruction projects.
The new Iraqi government, even one pragmatically 
negotiated on the basis of national unity and power-
sharing, is unlikely to deal successfully on its own with 
these twin challenges, or, for that matter, with any of 
the other problems facing the shattered country. uS 
presence in Iraq is thus essential. In the violent aftermath 
of the Samarra mosque bombing, both Shiites and the 
Sunnis have increasingly, and ironically, come to see the 
US presence as having a moderating effect on sectarian 
violence. Moreover, having invaded the country, we 
have an obligation to help Iraqis out of the political in-
security and economic disarray our policies and actions 
have caused.
National self interest, not altruism, dictates this obliga-
tion. To fulfill it, however, requires us to refocus our 
misguided concern with bringing the troops home to 
the more important concern with our strategic national 
interests in the Middle East as the overriding goal of our 
Iraq policy. The Bush administration has been inexcus-
ably derelict in articulating that national interest and its 
relationship to its Iraq policy. But that does not mean 
that there are no strategic US national interests in the 
Middle East, or that they are unrelated to our actions in 
. For the latest and the best assessment of the failure of US 
postwar reconstruction policy in Iraq, see David L. Phillips, 
Losing Iraq: Inside the Postwar Reconstruction Fiasco 
(Boulder, CO: Westview, 2005) 
Iraq. The important US strategic interests in the Middle 
East include: coping with Iran’s nuclear ambition and 
the threat it poses to Israel, Saudi Arabia and the region; 
combating al-Qaeda and its terrorist networks (a goal 
totally unrelated to the invasion of Iraq); keeping the 
Persian Gulf oil supply line open (not to feed US appe-
tite for oil, since our consumption of Middle East  
oil is negligible, but to keep the European and Japanese 
economies that depend on it strong, and to maintain 
a stable world oil market); and promoting democracy 
as an indispensable tool in the fight against terrorism. 
The US invasion (even though ill-timed and strategi-
cally misguided in implementation, but correct in its 
central objective of removing Saddam Hussein) and 
the occupation of Iraq (despite the many mistakes in 
its implementation) are inextricably intertwined with 
these interests.
Withdrawing US troops from Iraq in the near future 
is thus supremely irresponsible. President Bush has 
responsibly decided that US troops will not be with-
drawn, but has irresponsibly failed, again, to justify that 
decision in terms of the important US national interests 
at stake in Iraq and the Middle East. Whether the next 
administration will act more responsibly will depend on 
whether the American public will demand such respon-
sibility. That, however, is very unlikely.
—Shaheen Mozaffar is Professor of Political Science.
number and intensity of violence at the end of 2004  
that peaked with the TNA elections in January 2005 
was driven by a loose alliance of diehard Baathists,  
Sunni Islamic extremists, and Al-Qaeda in 
Mesopotamia (AQM). The AQM is offshoot of Osama 
Bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda network formed in Iraq by the 
Jordanian insurgent Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in the polit-
ical chaos that followed the US occupation. Implacably 
opposed to the US occupation and the emerging Shiite 
political power, these groups sought nothing less than 
the total removal of all foreign troops from Iraq and 
to halt the unfolding process of democratic transition. 
An undetermined number of fragmented groups of 
nationalist-secularist Sunnis, who accepted the demise 
of the Saddam regime but not the loss of Sunni political 
power, initially joined these extremist groups and, with 
the tacit support of the Sunni population who had been 
encouraged to boycott the TNA elections, engaged in 
political violence that was at the time directed princi-
pally at US and coalition forces.
However, the success of the TNA elections and the 
exclusion of the Sunnis from the constitution writing 
forced these moderate Sunni groups to reconsider their 
position and adopt a political strategy aimed at negoti-
ating concessions on the new constitution in return for 
embracing the new democratic dispensation, combined 
with an armed strategy aimed at using low-intensity 
violence to bolster their negotiating position. This new 
strategy put the Sunni insurgents at odds with the die-
hard Baathists and led to armed clashes between them 
and the AQM, not the least because AQM was dominat-
ed by foreign jihadists (including Zarqawi) and because 
it relied heavily on suicide bombings that were killing 
growing numbers of Iraqis. But, coupled with the new 
IECI security measures, the new strategy also helped to 
reduce the level of violence and dramatically increase 









































figure 1  







      0
         Sunni   Mixed   Shiite    Kurds
                 Regions
















brIdGewater reVIew                 
June 2006 9
referendum and the December COR elections. The 
Sunni embrace of democratic transition enhanced the 
prospects of its success, forcing the diehard Baathists 
and the AQM to shift to sectarian violence in which 
Iraqi religious and political leaders and the new Iraqi 
police and military forces replaced the US and coalition 
forces as the principal targets.
The resounding success of the December elections 
in improving Sunni representation in the COR and 
participation in the new government precipitated the 
Samarra mosque bombing, most probably by AQM, as 
a last-ditch effort by extremists in the hope of unleash-
ing retaliatory sectarian attacks that would destabilize 
the country and derail the democratic transition. That 
such attacks occurred with increasing frequency and 
frightening intensity in the immediate aftermath of the 
bombing before subsiding testifies less to the success 
of the extremists’ tactics than to the disturbingly large 
numbers of Sunni and Shiite militias that have emerged 
in Iraq to fill the security vacuum created by inad-
equate US forces and the inexperience of the new Iraqi 
military and security forces. That these militias could 
themselves become the instruments of a prolonged 
Lebanon-style civil war cannot be discounted. To defuse 
this potentially explosive situation, the quick formation 
of government of national unity becomes all the more 
imperative.
CONCLUSION 
On April 23, 2005, after weeks of hard and contentious 
bargaining that led to the replacement of Ibrahim Jaafri 
with his deputy Nouri al-Maliki as the candidate for 
Prime Minister, the COR, meeting only for the second 
time since the December elections, authorized the new 
candidate to form a cabinet within the stipulated 30 
days and approved five key appointments that pave 
the way for the formation of a national unity govern-
ment. The COR reappointed the current President 
Jalal Talabani, a Kurd, and also appointed a Sunni and a 
Shitte as the two Vice-Presidents. It also elected a Sunni 
as the Speaker of the COR, and a Shiite and a Kurd as 
the two Deputy-Speakers.
These, however, are only the first steps. Jockeying for 
positions in the new cabinet will produce a new round 
of intense and possibly acrimonious bargaining. After 
the installation of the new cabinet, the new govern-
ment will have to confront, among the host of problems 
facing Iraq, the twin and related challenges of security 
and economic reconstruction. Insecurity remains the 
single most important threat to Iraq’s political stability. 
Confronting it will require convincing the remaining 
diehard Baathists that it is in their and the country’s in-
terest to accept the new reality. It will require defeating 
the AQM by killing the foreign jihadists who dominate 
it, simply because they will not give up without a 
fight. But most critically, it will require controlling and 
disbanding all the Sunni and Shiite militias that now 
provide much-needed security in a dangerously insecure 
environment, for, if left unchecked, they could easily 
transform themselves into permanent protection rack-
ets, as, for example,  in Afghanistan.
Security is also essential for the much-need economic 
reconstruction and development. Despite the invest-
ment of vast amounts of US funds, a variety of strategic 
and tactical mistakes that have become the hallmark of 
US policy in Iraq has contributed to the failure of the 
Iraqi economy to return even to its anemic pre-war lev-
els.4  Initial assessments based on flawed assumptions 
and intelligence viewed Iraq’s enormous oil resource as a 
crucial source for financing the postwar reconstruction. 
But in response to the international embargo imposed 
on Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War, Saddam Hussein cut 
back on the investments required to maintain and 
modernize the oil production facilities. Increased post-
war oil production has thus been stymied by decaying 
infrastructure.
Compounding the problem has been the terrorist and 
insurgent attacks on the oil facilities, as well as on many 
postwar reconstruction projects, killing both foreign 
contractors and Iraqi workers. The diversion of increas-
ingly larger amount of US reconstruction funds to the 
provision of security for these construction sites and  
oil refineries has, as a result, depleted the amount avail-
able for modernizing the oil facilities and financing the 
reconstruction projects.
The new Iraqi government, even one pragmatically 
negotiated on the basis of national unity and power-
sharing, is unlikely to deal successfully on its own with 
these twin challenges, or, for that matter, with any of 
the other problems facing the shattered country. uS 
presence in Iraq is thus essential. In the violent aftermath 
of the Samarra mosque bombing, both Shiites and the 
Sunnis have increasingly, and ironically, come to see the 
US presence as having a moderating effect on sectarian 
violence. Moreover, having invaded the country, we 
have an obligation to help Iraqis out of the political in-
security and economic disarray our policies and actions 
have caused.
National self interest, not altruism, dictates this obliga-
tion. To fulfill it, however, requires us to refocus our 
misguided concern with bringing the troops home to 
the more important concern with our strategic national 
interests in the Middle East as the overriding goal of our 
Iraq policy. The Bush administration has been inexcus-
ably derelict in articulating that national interest and its 
relationship to its Iraq policy. But that does not mean 
that there are no strategic US national interests in the 
Middle East, or that they are unrelated to our actions in 
. For the latest and the best assessment of the failure of US 
postwar reconstruction policy in Iraq, see David L. Phillips, 
Losing Iraq: Inside the Postwar Reconstruction Fiasco 
(Boulder, CO: Westview, 2005) 
Iraq. The important US strategic interests in the Middle 
East include: coping with Iran’s nuclear ambition and 
the threat it poses to Israel, Saudi Arabia and the region; 
combating al-Qaeda and its terrorist networks (a goal 
totally unrelated to the invasion of Iraq); keeping the 
Persian Gulf oil supply line open (not to feed US appe-
tite for oil, since our consumption of Middle East  
oil is negligible, but to keep the European and Japanese 
economies that depend on it strong, and to maintain 
a stable world oil market); and promoting democracy 
as an indispensable tool in the fight against terrorism. 
The US invasion (even though ill-timed and strategi-
cally misguided in implementation, but correct in its 
central objective of removing Saddam Hussein) and 
the occupation of Iraq (despite the many mistakes in 
its implementation) are inextricably intertwined with 
these interests.
Withdrawing US troops from Iraq in the near future 
is thus supremely irresponsible. President Bush has 
responsibly decided that US troops will not be with-
drawn, but has irresponsibly failed, again, to justify that 
decision in terms of the important US national interests 
at stake in Iraq and the Middle East. Whether the next 
administration will act more responsibly will depend on 
whether the American public will demand such respon-
sibility. That, however, is very unlikely.
—Shaheen Mozaffar is Professor of Political Science.
number and intensity of violence at the end of 2004  
that peaked with the TNA elections in January 2005 
was driven by a loose alliance of diehard Baathists,  
Sunni Islamic extremists, and Al-Qaeda in 
Mesopotamia (AQM). The AQM is offshoot of Osama 
Bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda network formed in Iraq by the 
Jordanian insurgent Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in the polit-
ical chaos that followed the US occupation. Implacably 
opposed to the US occupation and the emerging Shiite 
political power, these groups sought nothing less than 
the total removal of all foreign troops from Iraq and 
to halt the unfolding process of democratic transition. 
An undetermined number of fragmented groups of 
nationalist-secularist Sunnis, who accepted the demise 
of the Saddam regime but not the loss of Sunni political 
power, initially joined these extremist groups and, with 
the tacit support of the Sunni population who had been 
encouraged to boycott the TNA elections, engaged in 
political violence that was at the time directed princi-
pally at US and coalition forces.
However, the success of the TNA elections and the 
exclusion of the Sunnis from the constitution writing 
forced these moderate Sunni groups to reconsider their 
position and adopt a political strategy aimed at negoti-
ating concessions on the new constitution in return for 
embracing the new democratic dispensation, combined 
with an armed strategy aimed at using low-intensity 
violence to bolster their negotiating position. This new 
strategy put the Sunni insurgents at odds with the die-
hard Baathists and led to armed clashes between them 
and the AQM, not the least because AQM was dominat-
ed by foreign jihadists (including Zarqawi) and because 
it relied heavily on suicide bombings that were killing 
growing numbers of Iraqis. But, coupled with the new 
IECI security measures, the new strategy also helped to 
reduce the level of violence and dramatically increase 









































figure 1  







      0
         Sunni   Mixed   Shiite    Kurds
                 Regions
Source: Calculated by author from various sources
Sunni 
4103
Mixed 
4244
Shiite 
447 Kurds 
5
N
um
be
r o
f a
tta
ck
s
